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Abstract—Malware analysis has been extensively investigated 
as the number and types of malware has increased dramatically. 
However, most previous studies use end-to-end systems to detect 
whether a sample is malicious, or to identify its malware family. In 
this paper, we propose a neural network framework composed of 
an embedder, an encoder, and a filter to learn malware 
representations from characteristic execution sequences for 
malware family classification. The embedder uses BERT and 
Sent2Vec, state-of-the-art embedding modules, to capture 
relations within a single API call and among consecutive API calls 
in an execution trace. The encoder comprises gated recurrent units 
(GRU) to preserve the ordinal position of API calls and a self-
attention mechanism for comparing intra-relations among 
different positions of API calls. The filter identifies representative 
API calls to build the malware representation. We conduct broad 
experiments to determine the influence of individual framework 
components. The results show that the proposed framework 
outperforms the baselines, and also demonstrates that considering 
Sent2Vec to learn complete API call embeddings and GRU to 
explicitly preserve ordinal information yields more information 
and thus significant improvements. Also, the proposed approach 
effectively classifies new malicious execution traces on the basis of 
similarities with previously collected families. 
 
Index Terms—deep learning, malware analysis, malware family 
classification, neural network 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
alware such as computer viruses, Internet worms, and 
Trojan horses is one of the main threats in computer 
security, because with it malignant actors disrupt or infect 
network services, destroy software or data, steal sensitive 
information, or take control of a host, often resulting in personal 
or business losses. This explains the growing interest in 
malware detection [1], [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7], [8] and malware 
classification [9], [10], [11], [12], [13], [14]. 
Anti-virus products have focused on using individual 
malware signatures to detect malware. More recently, with the 
development of obfuscation techniques, a number of variants of 
a malware family can be mutated using polymorphic or 
metamorphic techniques. As the resultant similar behavior 
increases the difficulty of identifying effective signatures, 
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malware can bypass static signature-based detection and evade 
commercial virus scanners [4], [15]. In addition, both Sebastián 
[16] and Chiu [17] pointed out that labels from different anti-
virus vendors are inconsistent. Thus malware may have 
different family labels assigned by different AV vendors. This 
can be a limitation for a model which assigns only one label to 
each malware sample. 
When investigating a given malware sample, most current 
studies propose end-to-end systems to detect whether the 
sample is malicious or to identify its malware family. However, 
from Chiu’s [17] observation, variants from the same family 
can exhibit distinct behavior.  If a model analyzes malware only 
as a single unit, it can fail to detect or classify unseen variants 
of known malware. Thus, rather than detecting individual 
malware signatures, a number of studies [11], [12], [13], [17], 
[18] focus their attention instead on analyzing malware 
behavior recorded at runtime. 
Instead of considering a malware sample as a whole, we 
consider if malware has common behaviors inherited from its 
malware family. The grouping criteria of a malware family are 
based on common characteristics such as attribution to the same 
authors or the same intention, which reflect the main intents 
from the observed execution activities. Fig. 1 describes our 
intuition. Malware samples within the same family share 
characteristics from execution traces. We design a neural 
network framework to capture this invariant representation 
within a family, which should exclude distinct behaviors. 
Moreover, when an unknown sample is given, its representation 
can be compared with the learned common characteristics of 
families. Sufficient matches can identify the sample as 
belonging to a known malware family.  
In this paper, we classify neural malware families by learning 
malware representations. A malware representation is learned 
using an embedder, an encoder, and a filter. The embedder is 
composed of two state-of-the-art embedding models — BERT 
[19] and Sent2Vec [20] — to capture relations within a single 
API call and among consecutive API calls in a trace. The 
encoder comprises two neural layers: a gated recurrent unit [21] 
designed to preserve the ordinal position of API calls in the 
trace, and a self-attention mechanism [22] to compare intra-
relations among the different positions of API calls. The filter 
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identifies representative API calls to build a malware 
representation for family classification. The model corrects 
shortcomings of previous work, which pay attention only to a 
single malware sample’s behavior without accounting for 
common characteristics within a family. In general, the 
proposed framework leads to a better understanding of malware 
characteristics for malware family classification. This paper 
makes the following contributions: 
• We develop a neural network framework to learn 
malware representation based on invariant characteristics 
of a malware family.  
• We design an embedder to preserve semantics of 
parameters in API statements from a malware execution 
trace. 
• We design an encoder that takes into account temporal 
relationships and correlates relevant events of API 
statements in a malware execution trace.  
• We visualize malware representation in a temporal space, 
demonstrating that the representation is explainable with 
physical meaning. 
II. RELATED WORK 
A. Features Used in Static and Dynamic Analysis 
A large body of literature exists in malware behavior analysis. 
This can be classified into static analysis [2], [23] and dynamic 
analysis [11], [12], [13], [18].  
Static analysis collects information from binaries or source 
code by decompressing or unpacking rather than executing 
them. Input features such as byte sequence n-grams [3], [5], 
opcodes [24], [25], string signatures [6], and control flow 
graphs [26] are used in static analysis. Saxe et al. [5], an 
example of static analysis, incorporated features extracted from 
binary PE files such as contextual bytes, PE imports, string 2d 
histograms, and PE metadata features into a deep neural 
network model. They demonstrated low false positive rates and 
high scalability. Malware derived from the same source code or 
belonging to the same family often shares a large percentage of 
source code or instruction blocks; however, this approach does 
not work for obfuscated malware.  
Dynamic analysis focuses on execution activities from 
Windows API calls [11], [13] or system calls [24] when a 
device has been infected. Activities such as registry calls, file 
I/O, and network features are used to identify malicious activity. 
Dahl et al. [11] extracted patterns observed from tri-grams of 
system API calls, distinct combinations of a single system API 
call and an input parameter identify a file as malicious or benign. 
DeepSign [13] selected frequent unigrams of Windows API 
calls from a log file generated by Cuckoo sandbox and 
transformed these into binary vectors to train a deep belief 
network for classifying malware and benign files. Dynamic 
analysis not only accounts for obfuscated, encrypted, and 
packed source code, but also captures malicious activities from 
observed evidence.  
B. Machine Learning and Deep Learning for Malware 
Analysis 
Over the last few decades, there has been a dramatic increase 
in the number of publications on malware analysis using 
machine learning techniques. Algorithms such as naive bayes 
[1], decision trees [27], [28], support vector machines [27], [28], 
and random forests [28] have been investigated for malware 
detection. These have shown that behavior patterns obtained 
from statistical methods can be used to detect or classify 
unknown samples into their families successfully; the methods 
yield comparable performance. 
In recent years, we have seen mounting evidence of the 
 
 
Fig. 1 Proposed framework. The model learns malware representations from common patterns within a family. When given an unknown sample, the 
proposed model finds the most similar characteristics from a known family. 
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usefulness of incorporating neural networks into malware 
analysis; this produce better results than using machine learning 
techniques. Dahl et al. [11] trained an artificial neural network 
model for malware detection. Athiwaratkun et al. [14] treated 
an API call event as a character, and applied convolutional 
neural networks to learn character-based events for malware 
classification. Agrawal et al. [7] combine two powerful neural 
network models—long short-term memory (LSTM) networks 
and convolutional neural networks (CNNs)—for malware 
detection. Agrawal et al. [8] presented attention-based recurrent 
neural networks for capturing local event patterns in 
ransomware sequences. At present, however, most current 
malware analysis systems focus on end-to-end neural network 
models to detect whether a sample is malware, or identify which 
malware family it belongs to, without interpreting the sample in 
a physical numerical space. 
III. MALWARE EXECUTION PROFILE AND REPRESENTATIVE 
MOTIF SEQUENCE GENERATION 
When given a malware sample, we first use an automatic 
dynamic malware profiling system to record execution profiles 
as inputs, after which profiles in the same families are aligned 
and grouped using the runtime API call sequence-based motif 
mining algorithm (RasMMA) [17], a clustering algorithm 
which extracts common behaviors within a family as outputs.  
A. Execution Trace Generation 
1) VMI-based profiling system 
To capture the essentials of the execution behavior of a 
malware program and to enable the target system to identify and 
characterize the intent of every phase’s operations during the 
course of the execution of the malware, we use an automated 
dynamic malware behavior profiling and analysis system based 
on virtual machine introspection (VMI) [29], [30]. This system 
hooks 62 carefully-selected Windows API calls in five 
categories: library use, process invocation, file I/O, registry 
access, and network access. Unlike many past dynamic 
behavior analysis system or tools, which record only API 
function names for profiling, the system additionally records 
parameters and return values, for example allowing users to 
understand what process is opened or what DLL file is loaded. 
Moreover, since in the Windows system, the registry contains 
important configuration information for the operating system, 
services, applications, and user settings, registry-related 
operations are important in malicious behavior analysis; 
parameter values are particularly critical. For instance, 
RegQueryValue() is called by many programs to check system 
or application settings. Given the registry key path and value 
name for the function’s hkey parameter, we can determine 
which registry the query refers to. In the profiling system, the 
function name and its corresponding parameter values and 
return value are all recorded. Also, a malware sample may 
create or fork one or more processes. One execution trace is 
generated per process. The advantage of the system is that it 
records only selected API calls rather than all system calls, 
which reduces trace sizes by at least two orders of magnitude. 
2) Trace cleaning 
Recording five minutes of Windows API calls yields 
voluminous information. Shown in TABLE I are the 26 selected 
API function names, along with their associated parameter 
types and return values. As some malware duplicates the same 
API call repeatedly, in our recorded execution profile only the 
first API call is retained. For instance, a library file is reloaded 
by LoadLibrary() repeatedly; thus only the first API call is 
retained after cleaning the trace.  
 
TABLE I 
SELECTED WINDOWS API FUNCTION NAMES AND PARAMETER TYPES 
Category API function name Parameter name 
Registry RegCreateKey, 
RegDeleteKey, 
RegDeleteValue, 
RegEnumValue, 
RegQueryValue, 
RegSetValue 
hKey, lpSubKey, 
lpValueName 
Process CreateProcess, 
CreateRemoteThread, 
CreateThread, 
TerminateProcess, 
ExitProcess, OpenProcess, 
WinExec 
lpApplicationName, 
dwCreationFlags, 
uExitCode 
Network nternetOpen, 
InternetConnect, 
HttpSendRequest, 
GetUrlCacheEntryInfo, 
WinHttpConnect, 
WinHttpOpen, 
WinHttpOpenRequest, 
WinHttpReadData, 
WinHttpSendRequest 
lpszServerName, 
pswzServerName, 
nServerPort 
Library LoadLibrary lpFileName 
File CopyFile, CreateFile, 
DeleteFile 
lpFileName, 
lpExistingFileName, 
lpNewFileName, 
dwCreationDisposition, 
dwDesiredAccess, 
dwShareMode 
 
3) Parameter winnowing 
An execution trace contains all the parameter values of 
hooked API calls. We consider that not all parameter values 
directly reflect the semantics of the operation, and that malware 
with the same intent can have slightly different parameter 
values such as user-profile folders “user's Desktop” and “user’s 
Documents”, depending on the version of operating systems or 
its executable strategy. Thus parameter values are symbolized 
to select only significant parameters of an API call and reduce 
noise as described in [17]. Also, the traces are reformatted to 
present a Windows API call line by line. 
B. RasMMA 
 RasMMA (runtime API call sequence-based motif mining 
algorithm) [17] extracts common behaviors from a group of 
malware. Given two distinct clusters, an alignment of the two 
API call sequences is obtained via global sequence alignment 
(GSA) [31]. Similarity scores are then computed and ranked to 
determine whether the clusters should be merged or a new 
cluster created. This process is iterated until the termination 
conditions are met, resulting in not only the sequence motifs 
among the sequences, but also a set of behavior trees in the 
given set. A behavior tree is comprised of profiles having the 
common motifs. An example is shown in Fig. 2. Leaves G1, G2, 
G3, and G4 represent profiles and behavior trees G6 and G5 
represent common motifs among the children. Note that G4 is 
judged to be a loner tree because it has no sequences in common 
with the other given profiles. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Output from RasMMA: two behavior trees and a loner tree 
 
IV. PROFILE REPRESENTATION 
The purpose of this study is to build a profile representation 
by identifying a representative motif sequence from a given 
execution profile. The three proposed modules include (a) an 
embedder to transform each Windows API call invocation into 
a numerical vector and preserve relations within API call 
invocations and semantics of parameter values, (b) an encoder 
to process sequences of Windows API call vectors and calculate 
the associations among them, and (c) a filter to examine the 
importance of each Windows API call invocation and present 
the predicted representative motif sequences as a profile 
representation. Fig. 3 describes the model architecture. 
A. Task Definition 
Given an input trace x, we seek to identify the importance b 
of each Windows API call invocation to form a profile 
representation r. Given m Windows API call invocations, x is 
represented as x = {x1, …, xm}. The corresponding prediction b 
= {b1, …, bm} is a series of binary variables denoting whether 
call invocation xi is representative.  
B. Embedder 
A profile consists of a number of Windows API calls, each 
of which includes one or more parameter values, but with an 
enormous and diverse range of values. Complicating analysis, 
some malware generates random variables as parameter values. 
For example, Backdoor:Win32/Simda copies itself as 
“<variable><number>.exe” and generates various URL 
addresses to confuse anti-virus programs. The resulting 
unpredictable and sparse parameter values thus preclude the use 
of traditional methods such as term frequency. 
 
1 https://github.com/google-research/bert 
An embedder takes a variable-length execution trace x = 
{x1, …, xm} as the input and outputs a sequence of embedding 
vectors x’ = {x’1, …, x’m}. A Windows API invocation call xi 
consists of an API function name ni, one or more parameter 
values pi, and one (if any) return value reti. Previous work used 
one-hot encodings [7] or a learnable embedding matrix [8], [32] 
to represent input embeddings. Since parameter and return 
values are also considered in this work, it is difficult to adopt 
these approaches directly because of the infinite number of 
values. Additionally, advances in transfer learning such as 
ImageNet [33] first pre-train a neural network on a task and then 
fine-tune it to yield a new purpose-specific model. Thus, the 
embedder uses two state-of-the-art pre-trained models — 
BERT [19] and Sent2Vec [20] — to build an embedding matrix.  
BERT (bidirectional encoder representations from 
transformers) [19] is used to initialize the function name 
embedding n’i. It yields promising results in natural language 
processing tasks such as natural language processing and 
question answering. The key innovation of BERT is the 
learning of contextual relations not only between tokens in a 
single sentence but also between two contiguous sentences. 
BERT is pre-trained on Wikipedia articles and BooksCorpus 
and has been publicly released1.  
The trained BERT model is used as the basis for our 
embedder and is fine-tuned2 on our dataset. This allows the 
embedder to enhance the structure of a single Windows API call, 
including a function name, one or more parameter values, and 
one (if any) return value. Moreover, it yields a better 
understanding of relationships between two Windows API calls. 
Here, we take a single profile as a document and a single 
Windows API call as a sentence. After the training, we extract 
the last four hidden states of the selected function names and 
average them to initialize the learnable embedding matrix E as  
 
𝑛𝑖
′ =  𝐸𝑛𝑖 (1) 
 
where a parameter matrix E ∈ 𝑅𝑑×|𝑛| , where |n| denotes the 
number of selected function names, n = 26, and d denotes the 
embedding size, d = 768. 
Sent2Vec [20], used here for the complete Windows API call 
embedding c’i, is an unsupervised learning model for sentence 
embeddings, the basic concept behind which is that it considers 
not only unigrams but also n-gram sequences in a single 
sentence, allowing the model to learn the sentence embedding 
based on its possible constituent words. 
We treat a Windows API call as a sentence and use Sent2Vec 
to learn universal API call invocation embeddings. First, a 
complete Windows API call invocation x is changed to 
lowercase and tokenized by the delimiters “. ; , - + ^ ( ) / @ # ? ! 
& $ : } { \ * % ~ ' " = _ ”. The model learns each token and n-
gram embedding shown in a single Windows API call 
invocation. The complete API call embedding c’i is then the 
average of the n-gram embeddings along with the words 
 
2 https://github.com/huggingface/pytorch-
transformers/tree/master/examples/lm_finetuning  
𝑐𝑖
′ =  𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡2𝑉𝑒𝑐(𝑥𝑖) =
1
|𝑅(𝑥)|
∑ 𝑐′𝑤𝑤∈𝑅(𝑥)  (2) 
 
where R(x) is the list of n-grams in a given Windows API call 
invocation x, 𝑐′ ∈ 𝑅𝑑×1  represents the learned source 
embedding, and d denotes the size of embedding size, d = 768. 
The embedding matrix C′ ∈ 𝑅𝑑×|𝑐| is obtained after training on 
our dataset and is frozen in the following procedure, where |c| 
denotes the number of API calls in our dataset. 
Each embedding x’i is composed of a function name 
embedding n’i and a complete API call embedding c’i: 
 
𝑥𝑖
′ = 𝑛𝑖
′  ⨁ 𝑐𝑖
′ (3) 
 
where ⨁  is element-wise addition. The function name 
embedding and complete API call embedding, projected to d-
dimension numerical space respectively, are summed to 
represent a Windows API call.  
C. Encoder 
An execution profile may be comprised of sequences of 
normal behavior, a number of redundant events, and a sequence 
of malicious actions. This can complicate the identification of 
representative motif sequences. Also, mixed dependencies exist 
among a sequence of Windows API call invocations. Therefore, 
it is crucial to recognize essential patterns in a given execution 
profile. 
With the encoder, we seek to process each API call 
invocation embedding x’ = {x’1, …, x’m} in an execution profile 
and produce a series of importance scores s = {s1, …, sm}. A 
given trace contains an arbitrary number of API call invocations, 
each of which may have close dependencies. The encoder 
accounts for this using a GRU layer, a self-attention layer, and 
a sigmoid layer. The GRU layer processes the time-series 
information over input embeddings, the self-attention layer 
calculates the association between input embeddings, and the 
sigmoid layer outputs a ratio between the probability that a 
certain API call is important or not.  
 Gated recurrent units [21] are part of the recurrent neural 
network (RNN) family and are used to learn a hidden state hi at 
timestep i which can be seen as a summary of the past sequence 
from the beginning up to i-1 and the current input x’i. 
 
ℎ𝑖 =  𝐺𝑅𝑈(𝑥𝑖
′, ℎ𝑖−1) (4) 
 
This summary maps an arbitrary length sequence {h1, …, hi-
1} and the current observation x’i to a fixed length vector hi. It 
preserves the ordinal position of the API calls in the trace. That 
is, the GRU hidden state ℎ𝑖  at time i is indeed the result of 
processing the API call embeddings from the first x’1 to the 
current observed API call embedding x’i. Moreover, compared 
to other RNNs, GRU not only solves the vanishing gradient 
problem [34] but also produces equally excellent results. 
We utilize a self-attention layer [22] to compute the weighted 
API call representation Z over the output H from the GRU layer. 
The hidden matrix H from GRU is projected into distinct key, 
value, and query representations K, V, and Q with three distinct 
 
 
 
Fig. 3.  Model architecture 
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weight matrices WK, WV, and WQ respectively, where 𝐾, 𝑉, 𝑄 ∈
𝑅𝑚×|ℎ|,𝑊𝐾 ,𝑊𝑉 ,𝑊𝑄 ∈ 𝑅|ℎ|×|ℎ| . The attention weights are 
calculated by comparing each pair of Windows API calls from 
Q and K, scaled by the inverse square root of their hidden 
dimension |h|, and normalized with the softmax function to 
produce a distinct distribution for each API in a profile. Finally, 
these weights are then multiplied by themselves V to obtain the 
self-attended API call representations 
 
𝑍 = 𝑠𝑜𝑓𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑥(
𝑄𝐾𝑇
√|ℎ|
)𝑉, (5) 
 
where 𝑍 ∈ 𝑅𝑚×|ℎ|.  
A self-attended API call representation zi can be seen as the 
weighted summarization with respect to the API call input i 
over the API call representations in V. This is in contrast to 
previous work [32] which focuses only on consecutive API call 
sequences in a given profile. The self-attention mechanism 
compares intra-relations and captures the relative importance 
among the different positions of API calls. This helps the model 
learn relative information from inconsecutive API calls.  
Representation Z is then passed to a feed-forward layer, 
which consists of a linear layer and a sigmoid layer. The 
sigmoid layer outputs the conditional probabilities of the 
estimation, called importance score s = {s1, …, sm}. It describes 
the ratio between the probability that a Windows API call is 
important, and the probability that it is not: 
 
𝑆 =  𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑚𝑜𝑖𝑑(𝑍𝑊𝑧), (6) 
 
where 𝑊𝑧 ∈ 𝑅|ℎ|×1. 
 
D. Training 
We trained the model using binary cross-entropy loss:  
 
𝐿 = −
1
𝑛
∑ 𝑠𝑖 log(𝑠?̂?) + (1 − 𝑠𝑖)log (1 − 𝑠?̂?)
𝑛
𝑖=1 , (7) 
 
where n is the number of profiles in a training set. The Adam 
optimizer [33] was used, and early stopping [35] was employed 
on the development set to prevent overfitting.   
 
E. Filter 
Once the model is well-trained, the filter is a threshold by 
which to examine each value of the predicted importance score 
?̂? = {𝑠1̂, … , 𝑠?̂?} on the development set and transform it into a 
series of binary vectors 𝑏 = {𝑏1, … , 𝑏𝑚} if it does not meet the 
boundary condition  .  Here, 𝑏 ∈ {0,1} and 0.01 ≤  ≤ 0.99. 
 
 = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛𝜗 𝐹𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒(𝑠, 𝑏) − ℎ𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠(𝑠, 𝑏) (8) 
 
3 https://www.virustotal.com 
4 Collected manually, the generic list includes adinstaller, adware, agent, 
antifw, antifwk, appl, application, applicunwnt, autorun, backdoor, 
behaveslike, bundleapp, bundler, bundleinstaller, click, cloud, crypt, cryptor, 
confidence, deepscan, der, dropped, dropper, downloader, downware, 
eldorado, famvt, generic, grayware, hacktool, heur, heuristic, high, hw32, in-
 
The threshold is selected based on the difference between the 
F1 score and Hamming loss. F1 is the harmonic average of the 
precision and recall, and Hamming loss is the fraction of the 
wrong labels to the total number of predictions. Thus, the 
threshold is chosen where the performance is best with the 
fewest mislabels. Threshold value   is selected on the 
development set, as described in Section V.D. 
F. Profile representation 
The profile representation r is the mean of the selected 
Windows API call embedding x’ corresponding to the estimated 
binary vector b. 
 
𝑟𝑖 =
∑ 𝑏𝑖
𝑚
𝑖=1 𝑥𝑖
′
∑ 𝑏𝑖
𝑚
𝑖=1
 (9) 
 
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
A. Dataset 
We collected 24,096 malware samples. Using the VMI 
profiling system, we recorded 33,496 profiles from 21,724 
samples. 2,372 samples failed because they were not executable 
files. 
To obtain the family labels for our samples, the samples were 
uploaded to the VirusTotal website3 in May, 2019. VirusTotal 
returned more than 50 family labels defined by various anti-
virus vendors. However, the family labels have some 
differences. For example, 
000e99026fee09d3bf5f51f9a6fcc9543cbe9088d60c84 
4afb10c38d69f3b91d, is labeled WORM/Vobfus.CF, 
Gen:Variant.Chinky, and Win32/AutoRun.VB.AGQ, by Avira, 
BitDefender, and ESET-NOD32 respectively. Anti-virus 
vendors each have their own naming schemes, and thus seldom 
reach a consensus. In previous work [17], we describe how we 
determined the family label for each sample in our dataset.  
First, we filtered out anti-virus vendors with low detection 
rates and benign samples. We selected as our representative 
anti-virus vendors those 47 anti-virus vendors which returned 
more than 40% of the detection results in our dataset. We 
removed 158 samples which were not detected as malicious by 
the anti-virus vendors. Second, we removed irrelevant strings 
in the collected labels. Each label was changed to lowercase and 
tokenized by delimiters “\ , ! ( ) [ ] @ : / . _ - ”. Tokens in a 
generic list4  or tokens whose length is less than three were 
removed, except for kdz, ipz, and lmn. Third, the family label 
was decided by a majority vote. To ensure labels were 
consistent with most of the representative anti-virus vendors, 
we kept samples for which 10% of the vendors assign the same 
family name; in this step we excluded 6,072 samples.  The 
majority result among anti-virus vendors was used as the 
trojan, inject, injector, install, installer, kcloud, malicious, malware, malware-
cryptor, monitoringtool, networm, not-a-virus, oscope, optional, p2p-worm, 
packed, patcher, psudocode_V2.0.txt, potentially, wriskware, software, 
suspicious, tool, toolbar, troj, trojan, trojandownload, trojware, trojan-
downloader, trojan-dropper, trojan-clicker, unknown, unwanted-program, 
variant, virus, win32, worm, and xpack. 
sample’s family label. Finally, to assure that patterns from a 
family were representative, we removed families with less than 
fifteen samples, yielding 168 families.  
RasMMA was executed to produce the gold importance 
scores s. Taking 0.8 as the RasMMA similarity threshold, 4,877 
profiles were treated as loners and excluded as they showed no 
common behavior with others. Loner profiles will be discussed 
in Section VII. As two families showed no common behavior 
patterns, 23 samples from both families were removed. Lastly, 
we eliminated 4,877 profiles: those that belonged to fewer than 
three behavior trees or that contained fewer than ten motifs. 
This resulted in 9,819 profiles from 6,585 samples and 135 
families yielding 1,041 behavior trees. 
Since in practice some profiles contained too many or too 
few API calls, we excluded those samples with more than 226 
API calls (8%). The final dataset included 8,176 profiles from 
6,056 samples, 133 families, and 808 behavior trees. The details 
are shown in TABLE II. 
 
TABLE II 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 Samples Profiles Family BT 
Original 24,096 - - - 
A
fter 
VMI profiling 21,724 33,496 - - 
Family voting 13,903 21,774 168 - 
RasMMA labeling 6,585 9,819 135 1,041 
Length pruning 6,056 8,176 133 808 
 
We randomly divided the dataset into a training set (80%), a 
development set (10%), and a testing set (10%). If a sample had 
fewer than 10 behavior trees, it was excluded from the 
development and test sets. More details are shown in TABLE 
III. 
 
TABLE III 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR TRAINING, DEVELOPMENT, AND TESTING SETS 
 Training set Development set Test set 
Samples 5,466 431 481 
Profiles 7,215 453 508 
Families 133 47 47 
Trees 808 135 135 
 
B. Implementation Details 
We set the embedding unit and the hidden unit size to 768 
and 192 respectively. We used the Adam optimizer with a 
learning rate of 0.001. We trained for 119 epochs; the best 
model was selected at the 89th epoch based on the lowest 
validation loss, as shown in Fig. 4. The mini-batch size for the 
update was set to 128, and threshold   was selected as 0.51 
based on the development set. 
 
 
Fig. 4.  Training and development set loss  
 
C. Metrics 
To compare the estimated binary vector b with the gold 
important score s, we report our result on the test set with the 
following evaluation criteria: 
• True positive (TP): prediction b = 1 and gold score s = 1 
• False positive (FP): b = 1 but s = 0 
• False negative (FN): b = 0 but s = 1 
• Precision denotes the number of estimated important 
Windows API calls that are predicted correctly: 𝑃 =
𝑇𝑃
𝑇𝑃+𝐹𝑃
 
• Recall denotes the ratio of correctly estimated important 
Windows API calls to all profiles, reflecting the 
classifier’s ability to detect all important API calls: 𝑅 =
𝑇𝑃
𝑇𝑃+𝐹𝑁
 
• The F1 score denotes the weighted average of precision 
and recall:  𝐹 =
2𝑃𝑅
𝑃+𝑅
 
• Hamming loss denotes the fraction of mislabeled labels 
to the total profiles (Schapire and Singer, 1999): 𝐻 =
𝑋𝑂𝑅(𝑏,𝑠)
𝑚
, where m is the number of API calls in a given 
profile. 
D. Effectiveness of each component in the framework 
We conducted ablation tests to assess the impact of 
• Using both the function name embedding and the 
complete API call embedding for the input embedding; 
• Using both the GRU and self-attention for the encoder. 
For the encoder, we additionally used two baseline 
components: a multi-layer perceptron (MLP) and a Transformer 
encoder [22]. The MLP is a traditional neural network in which 
we use two fully connected layers without any recurrent neural 
units or attention mechanism. The Transformer encoder is 
composed of positional encoding, self-attention, and a multi-
head attention mechanism. It adds positional information with 
the numbers between [-1, 1] using a predetermined sinusoidal 
function to the input embeddings, rather than the learned GRU. 
TABLE IV shows the performance for each model. The 
proposed model outperforms the other models by a large margin, 
showing that the proposed components in both the embedder 
and the encoder facilitate representative API call detection. The 
model clearly improves significantly when considering 
complete API call embeddings, demonstrating that the 
parameter values and the return values of a Windows API call 
explicitly provide more information and make it easier for the 
neural model to learn input values in a latent way. In addition, 
the performance drops when the encoder is replaced with the 
Transformer encoder with position encoding, suggesting that 
the learned GRU plays an important role in preserving ordinal 
information within Windows API calls. 
 
TABLE IV 
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
  P R F1 H 
Proposed framework 0.882  0.866  0.874  0.045  
Embedding     
 w/o function name embedding 0.858  0.860  0.859  0.051  
 w/o API call embedding 0.710  0.851  0.774  0.089  
Encoder     
 MLP 0.639  0.731  0.682  0.122  
 Transformer encoder (2017) 0.475  0.506  0.490  0.189  
 w/o self-attention 0.780  0.400  0.529  0.128  
 
To better understand the effect of filter thresholds, we 
evaluated the proposed framework with thresholds from 0.01 to 
0.99 on the test set. Fig. 5 is a plot of the test set performance 
in terms of four metrics. We observe that values in binary 
vectors are not filtered out for low thresholds, resulting in high 
recall but low precision from 0.01 to 0.49. At a threshold of 0.49, 
however, precision increases and Hamming loss falls, both 
dramatically. The best threshold on the development and test 
sets is 0.51. Thus, the leveraged strengths of both F1 and 
Hamming loss result in better overall performance.  
 
 
VI. MALWARE FAMILY CLASSIFICATION EVALUATION 
A. Experimental Setting 
Using the same dataset from Section V.A and given a profile 
representation r from the test set, we computed the cosine 
similarity between the profile r and each profile rt in the training 
set. 
 
𝑝 = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑡  𝑠𝑖𝑚(𝑟, 𝑟𝑡) (7) 
 
The estimated family label 𝑓?̂? is assigned based on the family 
label fp for the most similar profile p in the training set. Note 
that when more than one profile in the training set has the same 
(largest) similarity value, we consider all such family labels to 
be the predicted labels.  
 
5 http://projector.tensorflow.org/ 
B. Results 
The proposed model predicted API calls deemed 
representative based on the family characteristics; however, no 
API calls in 125 profiles (33%) in 22 families were predicted as 
"representative". One reason is the trade-off between recall and 
precision discussed in Section V.D. Another possible reason is 
there was less training data for these 22 families than for other 
families. For example, as Sirefef had only 10 profiles in the 
training dataset, it was difficult to learn its profile 
representations.  
In general, 374 to 508 profiles were correctly classified. Of 
the 383 estimated profiles, 97.65% were correctly matched to 
their own family. In particular, the profiles from thirty-nine 
families were 100% correctly estimated, suggesting that profile 
representations estimated by the proposed framework are robust 
across most malware families.  
Fig. 6 shows the match/mismatch results from the profiles in 
the seven families. In most cases, when a profile’s family is 
estimated incorrectly, its behavior tree is also assigned 
incorrectly. The sole exception is a profile from the vilsel family, 
which shares a behavior tree with another malware family. 
 
 
VII. DISCUSSION 
In this section, we visualize profile representations for the 
Allaple malware family to investigate the meanings of profile 
representations and loner trees in a given family, and to 
compare with profile representations from other families. 
We extracted each Allaple profile representation in the 
training set and test set respectively, and transformed them into 
2-dimensional vectors using an embedding projector 5  with 
UMAP [36]. The four major groups, corresponding to four 
RasMMA behavior trees, are shown in Fig. 7. Results show that 
most test set profiles are located near those from the training set. 
In TABLE V we provide a semantic description of each group: 
the model seems to learn the hidden information behind the 
behavior tree in both numerical and semantic spaces. 
The profiles, from Allaple but excluded in our dataset, were 
vectorized by the proposed model and visualized in Fig. 8. 
Although the samples were assigned the same labels by anti-
virus vendors, they are loners because their characteristics 
differ greatly from the others in the same family. Results show 
that the loners are not located near the dominant groups from 
 
 
Fig. 5. Experimental results on different thresholds in the filter setting  
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Fig. 6. Match/mismatch results for seven families 
  
the training set. This supports the results from [17], that is, the 
behavior of loners is distinct from those in the same family, and 
samples categorized by family names can be inconsistent even 
though they are decided by the majority. 
 
 
Fig. 7. 2D embedding of profile representations from Allaple family. The 
points (gray from training set, red from test set) are grouped by behavior trees. 
 
TABLE V 
SEMANTIC DESCRIPTION OF FOUR CLUSTERS 
ID Semantic description of behavior tree 
G2097 Queries registry about winsock2 and accesses crypt32.dll library. 
G2100 Queries registry about winsock2. 
G2087 Queries OS version and any information about installed browser.  
G2082 Malware repeatedly reduplicates itself as crack game executable 
file or program password generator. 
 
 
Fig. 8. 2D embedding of loner profile representations in Allaple family 
 
Fig. 9 shows all profile representations in the training set. 
Many profiles in the different families overlap within the major 
four behavior groups in the Allaple family. Our assumption is 
that families are differentiated from each other by behavior 
trees; however, this finding does not support this assumption. 
This could be due to pluralism, that is, the characteristics of a 
behavior tree extend across more than one family. For example, 
the graftor, virut, and exiro families share the G2097 behavior 
tree; symmi, solimba, and zusy share G2100; kazy, ramnit, and 
outbrowse share G2087. This demonstrates that a family can 
exhibit more than one type of behavior, and that some of these 
behaviors are shared by different families.  
 
 
Fig. 9. 2D embedding of all profile representations from training set 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
In this study, we propose representing a malware sample 
using one or more embedded characteristics, matching behavior 
patterns learned from a family, which goes beyond traditional 
methods which predict only whether an unknown sample is 
malicious or classify its family. We propose a novel neural 
network framework for learning malware representations which 
utilizes BERT and Sent2Vec to extract the properties of a single 
API call as well as consecutive API calls, uses GRU and self-
attention to reflect dependencies among API calls, and also uses 
a filter to determine significant API calls. We examine the 
effects of each component of the proposed model and show that 
the combination of all components, in particular full API call 
embeddings and ordinal information encoding, yields the best 
performance. Moreover, in an evaluation of family 
classification, 97.65% of unseen malicious execution traces 
were successfully classified on the basis of embedded 
characteristics that match previously collected families.  
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